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All societies are more or less complex systems of rules, of symbols and
signs directing and constraining individual behavior. The task of the
social theorist is to analyze and uncover what order may underlie such
structures. In this regard he faces at least two major problems. First, he
has to determine how far the rules or norms which govern human ac-
tion define the distribution of power, responsibility and resources, and
so determine the relative value placed upon such goods as education,
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art and scientific inquiry, and how far the existing structure of distri-
bution of power and resources is itself responsible for the prevalence of
particular rules. Second, he has to determine'how far the analytical
methods he brings to the study of his subject are genuinely tools
which facilitate social inquiry, and how far they embody presupposi-
tions which do not so much aid investigation as pre-determine its re-
sults. In both cases the theorist confronts questions about ideology.
In the first case, the theorist deals with ideology insofar as he is
forced to examine the problem of the relationship in any social struc-
ture between ideas and interests. For any worthwhile explanation of
social action must offer some account of how material circumstances
affect, or are affected by, the moral, religious, scientific and political
beliefs, customs and conventions which obtain in a society. What the
theorist cannot or should not do is uncritically to presume that the as-
sumptions implicit in those beliefs or customs or conventions can
themselves explain the operations of society. To do this would be
simply to offer a report of a society's self-image, of its ideology, rather
than to explain society's workings.
For example, it would be an inadequate explanation which de-
scribed the agencies of the state (the legislature, the police, the various
bureaucracies, and the judiciary) as disinterested servants whose ac-
tions are governed purely by their terms of reference and not at all by
any more parochial interests. For this picture assumes that the distri-
bution of power and resources is more or less the result of the state's
functioning within the formal constraints that guide it. Thus legis-
latures, with the aid of a disinterested bureaucracy, make laws, which
are upheld by the judiciary and enforced by the police, to serve the
common good. Generally, this picture is not questioned by society: by
its citizens or its non-state institutions such as the press.
Yet while each individual is at liberty to accept his society's public
self-conception, the social theorist is not. His concern is explanation.
And explanation demands that he look behind the self-image, behind
what we might call the ideology, to see what kinds of social relations
do in fact prevail. Many, if not most, social theorists recognize this.
Thus theorists of the Public Choice school, for example, seek to show
how the actual distribution of government expenditure is better ex-
plained by the nature and power of interest groups and the structure of
incentives in society than by the public philosophy of the welfare state,
while some Marxist theorists seek to show that the structure of social
relations embodied in the legal and political order is merely a facade
concealing the character of the more fundamental economic arrange-
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ments that persist, arrangements in which the interests of one social
class predominate. (To be a student, or critic, of ideology, however, it
is not enough simply to look behind the facade or self-image. It is also
necessary to explain how and why ideology is generated, and what
part, if any, ideology plays in the workings of society.)
The social theorist also confronts a problem of ideology in a differ-
ent sense. For if he thinks that the beliefs and conventions of society
must be understood as largely governed by the prevailing structure of
interests, he must also concede that his own methods of social inquiry,
conforming as they might to what he thinks are acceptable scientific
standards, may well be governed by something other than a disin-
terested concern for truth. In short, his arguments and inquiries may
be less "scientific" than "ideological." They may be governed by pre-
suppositions which reflect the interests of his society, or of his imme-
diate social grouping (such as the scientific community), rather than
by assumptions which are defensible by some more "objective" stan-
dard. Much of the argument in the philosophy of the social sciences
has been about what kinds of social explanation can properly be re-
garded as scientific, and so as valid, and what kinds of explanation are
"merely" ideological.
But what, precisely, is meant by ideology? This is a question which
has itself aroused controversy. David McLellan's short book, Ideology,
intended as "the briefest of introductions to an extremely slippery sub-
ject," is an attempt to get a handle on this problem. And the attempt is
made by tracing the efforts of various thinkers, the first notable one
being Marx, to "find a firm Archimedean point outside the sphere of
ideological discourse, an immovable spot from which to observe the
levers of ideology at work." Tracing the career of the concept over two
centuries, McLellan also examines the different Marxist conceptions of
ideology to be found in the writings of Lenin, Lukacs, Gramsci, and
Althusser, before turning to the non-Marxist traditions, and particu-
larly to the work of Mannheim. From here he goes on to look briefly
at a positivist claim which he thinks survives largely in America: that
social science can be non-ideological. This opens the way for a discus-
sion of the criticisms of this view emanating mainly from the Frank-
furt school.
In an all too brief concluding chapter, McLellan identifies two
strands of theorizing about ideology. In the first strand the domi-
nant contrast made is one between science and ideology. This science/
ideology dichotomy is to be found both in the Marxist traditions and
in the empiricist English-speaking tradition, which differ essentially
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over conceptions of science/ideology. The other strand of thinking,
however, emphasizes the problems of studying society, suggesting that
the social theorist cannot completely escape the interest-dominated
perspective in which he finds himself.
Can Ideology Be Overcome?
The conclusion McLellan moves toward in his attempt to elucidate the
concept of ideology is that any successful account of ideology must
recognize, on the one hand, the inadequacy of the science/ideology di-
chotomy, and on the other hand the inadequacy of any view suggest-
ing the omnipresence of ideology. Ideology, he wishes to maintain, "is
best viewed not as a separate system of signs and symbols that could be
contrasted with—and eventually replaced by—another, e.g., science
of some sort. Ideology is rather an aspect of every system of signs and
symbols in so far as they are implicated in an asymmetrical distribution
of power and resources." In effect, this means that the two problems of
ideology confronting the social theorist are not, as my earlier distinc-
tion suggests, separate problems but, rather, aspects of the same prob-
lem. The social theorist is confronted by a world in which ideas play
an important part, but also one in which those ideas are not wholly
autonomous but are in some way related to material circumstances and
interests. The ideas or methods he might use to investigate this world
are themselves implicated in its operation; they cannot be viewed as, or
refined into, neutral instruments with which we might dissect and
analyze the rest of the world of ideas. We cannot use non-ideological
tools to evaluate ideological phenomena. Thus it is unlikely that there
can ever be an "end to ideology" as, he suggests, both the Marxist and
the "Enlightenment, rationalist, empiricist" traditions have hoped.
It is difficult to evaluate McLellan's position, largely because it is
offered in a series of critical observations about the arguments of the
various theorists of ideology whose views are discussed in his book.
He is admirably clear when elucidating the views of Marx, Mann-
heim, and Habermas, and in identifying the difficulties in their respec-
tive accounts of ideology. But little space is devoted to offering his
own account of ideology, as opposed to indicating what such an ac-
count must do. It must, he says, combine two attributes: the first is "a
hermeneutic subtlety which both sees that it is necessary to understand
ideology before criticizing it and also adopts a self-reflexive attitude
towards its own premises"; the second is a concern "to preserve the
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concept's critical potential by linking it with analyses of control and
domination, thereby extricating it from the labyrinth of relativism
associated with the hermeneutic circle." Yet what precisely this means
or would involve remains obscure and undeveloped. For if ideology is
not to be contrasted with science, and is not pervasive or omnipresent
but is, rather, an "aspect" of every system, what is ideology?
What I think McLellan may mean is that we can come to a better
understanding of ideology if we look critically at the premises of our
arguments—by seeking, as Mannheim suggested, their social deter-
minants, and recognizing how they are implicated in the system of
ideas which control or dominate human activities.
McLellan's recommendation is, I think, mistaken. If we try to come
up with an account of ideology by following his strictures, by adopt-
ing a "self-reflexive attitude" toward the premises underlying our in-
vestigation, the first problem that emerges is that of how to adopt such
an attitude. What is a "self-reflexive" attitude? If it is a critical attitude,
the question-is, how might one adopt such an attitude given that one's
attitudes are already implicated in the ideological structure (and, ar-
guably, beyond one's control)?1 Moreover, it is unclear how adopting
such a stance can help to uncover the nature of ideology. McLellan's
suggestion that a successful account of ideology must recognize the
need "to understand ideology before criticizing it" is even more puz-
zling. For it really tells us nothing about how we are in fact to account
for ideology.
The problem is that McLellan's suggestion has it backwards. We
cannot come up with an account of ideology, or what is ideological in
the social world, merely by reflecting more seriously on the nature of
our arguments and assumptions, and leaving the task of social criti-
cism until this reflection is completed. Rather, it is the very process of
criticism of theories, ideas and institutions which enables us to un-
cover what is ideological: what is the product of particular interests or
generated largely by the dominance of particular social powers. By
allowing criticism to eliminate false theories we place ourselves in a
better position to identify those explanations which are ideological or
founded upon some prejudice. This does not, of course, guarantee that
we shall always be able to distinguish explanations sustained by ide-
ology from those which are not. (And certainly, as McLellan himself
notes, a theory whose success is determined by social factors is not for
that reason alone false.) Yet it is only by exposing all explanations to
criticism that we are likely to identify those of them that could only be
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sustained by the power or dominance of particular social interests and
therefore would not be able to resist critical challenge.
Now one objection which will be raised against the above view is
that it is itself an ideological position. Or at least in part: as McLellan
puts it, ideology is an aspect of every system insofar as its signs and
symbols are implicated in an asymmetrical distribution of power.
"And of which system," he asks us, "is this not the case?" Yet the ob-
jection is raised too hastily. For once it is recognized that the view that
all explanations should be open to criticism must itself be open to
criticism, we can see that it might well be sustained, not because of the
strength of particular interests, but because it is logically resistant to
attempts to refute it. At any rate, it would not do to brand this view as
simply "ideological" without some argument showing why it is so.
None of this, of course, is to suggest that McLellan is wrong to say
that ideology may be an aspect of all social systems. And indeed, he is
quite correct to insist that any definition of ideology "whereby it is
any and every action-oriented set of beliefs organized into a coherent
system" is unduly restrictive, and "robs the concept of its critical
edge." Ideology is a feature of the social world more generally, and not
simply of belief systems. Yet not every aspect of the social world is
ideology; so some account is needed of how we might distinguish ide-
ology from other aspects of that world. One promising way of pro-
ceeding is to take up the contrast Popper offers (and which I discuss
below) between ideology and objectivity, with objectivity understood
as a feature, not of belief systems or of consciousness, but of the social
world of ideas and explanations.
The virtue of Popper's view distinguishing ideology from objec-
tivity (or science) is that it takes seriously the problem the theorists of
ideology, such as Mannheim, identify: the problem of the social deter-
mination of ideas. Yet if we are all suffering under our own system of
prejudices, Popper suggests, we must be even more radically skeptical
than these sociologists of knowledge. This means recognizing that we
cannot hope to purge ourselves of our prejudices by socio-analysis. We
cannot "climb to a higher plane from which [we] can understand, socio-
analyze, and expurgate [our] ideological follies."2 For this reason ob-
jectivity is better understood as something we approach if the social
order is one in which public institutions facilitate rather than obstruct
free criticism of arguments, of beliefs and practices and of social in-
stitutions themselves.
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Can Liberalism Be Defined?
This conclusion, however, raises the larger question of what kind of
social order, precisely, is a defensible one. This is a question which
McLellan's analysis does not take him to. But it is the subject of
the two other books published along with his in the University of
Minnesota Press series "Concepts in Social Thought. "John Gray's Lib-
eralism and Robert Nisbet's Conservatism: Dream and Reality describe
and defend competing political visions which we might now examine
with profit.
Both books define the philosophies they defend by contrasting
them with rival political outlooks. And both share a common enemy:
socialism. But before proper sense can be made of the similarities and
differences between these two viewpoints, some terminological ques-
tions must be settled. The term "liberal," as has often been noted, has
different meanings in Britain and in the United States. In Britain it is
more readily associated with the classical liberal tradition, the tradition
of political thought which has its roots in the writings of Locke,
Hume and Adam Smith, and is more easily contrasted with the ideas
of democratic socialism. In the United States, however, the divide be-
tween liberalism and certain forms of socialism is much less clear.
Indeed, one prominent American defender of "liberalism," Bruce
Ackerman, in his book Social Justice and the Liberal State, is willing to
describe himself quite explicitly as a democratic socialist. So when
reading John Gray's book it should be noted at the outset that the "lib-
eralism" he defends is a form of classical liberalism. It should equally
be recognized that the "liberalism" Nisbet criticizes is not so easily
identified with the classical liberalism of Gray's account.
This terminological ambiguity does, however, present the occasion
for the most striking, and interesting, thesis of Gray's book: that there
is an important contrast to be drawn between classical liberalism and
the "revisionist" liberalism of modern times. The decisive break in the
liberal intellectual tradition in the last century came, he argues, "not
with the abandonment of natural rights theory for Utilitarianism or
the replacement of a negative conception of liberty with a positive one,
but instead with a new and hubristic rationalism." For while the classi-
cal liberals of the Scottish Enlightenment, and French liberals such as
Tocqueville and Constant, had recognized man's incapacity fully to
grasp the complexity of society, let alone to control it, the new liberals
"sought to submit the life of society to rational reconstruction." Thus
while the classical liberals saw progress as a by-product of free ex-
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change, the modern liberals in effect identify progress with the realiza-
tion in the world of a specific conception of a rational society. This
feature of modern liberalism may readily be identified in the thought
of John Stuart Mill. The results of this intellectual transformation, ac-
cording to Gray, are quite plain: "Once progress is conceived as the
realization of a rational plan of life rather than as the unpredictable ex-
foliation of human energies, it is inevitable that liberty should even-
tually be subordinated to the claims of progress." And that is, undoubt-
edly, what we have seen in this century.
Yet this thesis raises its own question. If there has indeed occurred so
decisive a break in the liberal intellectual tradition, what warrant have
we for calling modern liberalism "liberal"? Why, for example, should
John Rawls, whose work Gray praises, be regarded as a liberal—even if
not a classical liberal? This question cannot be answered without offer-
ing a fuller account of liberalism, and of the philosophical ideals which
lie at its heart; and this is what Gray's book attempts to do.
Liberalism, in Gray's view, constitutes a single tradition, rather than
two or more traditions, in virtue of four shared elements which com-
pose the liberal conception of man and society. First, liberalism is an
individualist philosophy which asserts the moral primacy of the person
against the claims of any social collectivity. Second, it is egalitarian,
according all individuals the same moral status. Third, it is universalist,
affirming the moral unity of humanity and giving secondary impor-
tance to specific historical associations. And, finally, it is meliorist, af-
firming the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and
political arrangements.
On this account, Rawls's theory seems to fall clearly within the lib-
eral canon and, indeed, Gray suggests that not even the many diffi-
culties in Rawls's work compromise his achievement in developing an
individualist defense of the liberal order in contractarian terms.
What is troubling, however, is that Rawls has tried (implausibly, as
Gray rightly notes) to maintain that the conclusions of his theory of
justice do not establish so much as a presumption in favor of free-
market economic systems over socialist ones. Moreover, nowhere in
his elucidation of his theory does Rawls accord any special weight to
what many would regard as a fundamental liberal freedom: freedom of
contract. What both of these observations point to is a distinction, im-
plicit in the political theory of Rawls and other "modern" liberals, be-
tween economic and non-economic freedoms, a distinction which op-
erates to deny the moral significance of the former.
But is it plausible to regard as liberals those who argue for a polity
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in which the state is justified in extensive involvement in vast areas of
individual activity, so long as it respects certain (undoubtedly impor-
tant) freedoms such as freedom of speech and freedom of worship?
Such "liberals" do indeed show all individuals "equal concern and re-
spect" (to use the phrase Ronald Dworkin, a self-proclaimed liberal,
employs), and they may also be described as "universalist" and "me-
liorist." But they also fail to emphasize the (classical) liberal concern
that, as far as possible, individuals should have control over, and be
responsible for, their own lives. The government, on this latter view,
should show the individual less concern and more respect. Since the
revisionist liberal view would disagree with this, it would seem that we
can rightly regard it as liberal only if we maintain that according indi-
viduals control over and responsibility for their own lives is a second-
ary and not a fundamental concern of liberalism.
Now it may be that this is necessary if we are accurately to charac-
terize the view of those modern liberals who, while in disagreement
with the proponents of classical liberalism, are nonetheless closer to
being liberals than they are to being conservatives' or socialists. Yet if
this concession is made, it will be necessary to recognize that several
other theorists hostile to liberalism are by this account liberals. G. A.
Cohen, Professor of Political Theory at Oxford University, for ex-
ample, is a Marxist by reputation and by his own admission; yet his
views incline him to defend a variant of market socialism in which in-
dividuals are entitled to the same freedoms that Rawls and Dworkin
would allow. Does the fact that his political philosophy is individual-
ist, egalitarian, universalist and meliorist mean that he too should be
regarded as a liberal thinker?
None of this is, of course, to suggest that Gray is unaware of these
difficulties, and his book, while thorough in its attempts to elucidate
the conflicts and arguments within the liberal tradition, is also quite
clear in its formulation of a particular conception of liberalism which he
thinks worth defending. So we should turn now from these termino-
logical issues to the more substantive question of what distinguishes
liberalism from other social philosophies. And here the contrast Gray
draws between liberalism and conservatism is instructive.
Is Conservatism Really Liberalism?
What most clearly characterizes conservative thought, according to
Gray's account, is a hostility to rationalism. This is not to say that all
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conservatives have refused to engage in any theoretical reflection on
political life, for we find in the works of Hegel, Burke and Oakeshott,
among others, writings which are fully as systematic as anything lib-
eral writers have produced. (Although one might query Gray's placing
of Burke in the camp of "systematic" thinkers!) Nonetheless, conser-
vatives have been highly critical of what they identify as the rationalist
strain that runs through liberalism. And, in the end, conservatives in-
sist that the central feature of political life, the relation between sub-
ject and ruler, cannot be explained or justified by liberal philosphy. For
liberalism's universalist and egalitarian pretensions incline it to ask
what kinds of relations involving authority are legitimate, and why?
This question involves a denial of the particularity and moral sepa-
rateness of historical communities which, in conservative thinking,
cannot intelligently be subjected to criticism rooted in abstract gener-
alizations about man. Thus "conservative thought proclaims its skep-
ticism of the generic humanity and abstract individuality it sees cele-
brated in liberalism and insists that the human individual is a cultural
achievement rather than a natural fact." Hence its central terms are au-
thority, loyalty, hierarchy and order, rather than equality, liberty and
mankind. Its emphasis is on the particularities of political life rather
than on any universal principles it may be thought to exemplify.
Yet before we can use this characterization of conservatism and the
comparison with liberalism to evaluate the worth of their respective
theories of society, we need to ask how accurate is Gray's account of the
conservative outlook. So we should turn to Nisbet's own version of
conservatism to see how the views of one self-confessed conservative
differ from those of a liberal critic.
Nisbet's variant of conservatism is in many ways difficult to cate-
gorize. His own view is that the conservatism he portrays takes Burke
as its greatest "prophet," and much of his commentary is indeed in-
formed by his reflections on Burke's writings. Yet at the same time he
brings under the conservative banner thinkers as diverse as Hegel,
Tocqueville, de Maistre, H. L. Mencken, Michael Oakeshott, and
F. A. Hayek. Among these figures, Mencken is difficult to classify as a
conservative in view of his disdain for authority; Hayek has denied that
he is any sort of a conservative; and Oakeshott draws inspiration, not
at all from Burke, but from Hobbes and Hegel. This might suggest to
some that Nisbet's conservatism is therefore better identified as be-
longing to a distinctively American conservative tradition. But such a
tradition has proven difficult to identify; and the problem is compli-
cated by Nisbet's distancing of himself from what he sees as the popu-
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list and non-isolationist strain in the ideas underpinning the Reagan
presidency.
Indeed, when reading Nisbet's book, one constantly asks the ques-
tion: can his brand of conservatism be differentiated from classical lib-
eralism? After all, he emphasizes the virtues of minimal government
and is highly critical of the welfare state; he defends a conception of
liberty which repudiates accounts, such as that of Rousseau, which he
takes to associate freedom with the subordination of the individual to
the community; he places great emphasis on the role of property in a
free society; and, while he stresses the importance of religion and the
family, he rejects completely the attempts of the Moral Majority to
secure these values more completely by using the state's powers of
enforcement.
In spite of these predispositions which he shares with the classical
liberals, Nisbet is a conservative nonetheless. The key to understand-
ing why is to be found in the views he, and all conservatives, hold
about the place of reason in political activity.
For Nisbet, the conservative's attitude to reason can be clearly dis-
cerned in "Burke's assault upon pure rationalism through laudation of
the unconscious, the prerational and the traditional." For conservatism
is suspicious of those who emphasize the use of deductive or "geo-
metric" reasoning in human affairs. This form of reasoning, it holds, is
of limited use, for human beings require for their nurture and advance-
ment a different kind of reasoning which emphasizes the importance
.of feelings, emotions and experience as well as logic. The knowledge
that such reasonings bring is not to be found in theoretical statements
or formulations but in our traditions of behavior, in our prejudices.
"Prejudice has its own intrinsic wisdom, one that is anterior to the
intellect."
Underlying the appeal to prejudice is a particular view of the nature
of knowledge which, according to conservatives, may be of two kinds.
In William James's terms, the contrast to be made is one between
"knowledge of" and "knowledge about." Knowledge of the first kind
is primarily practical knowledge, acquired through experience or di-
rect exposure to aspects of human life. It is not acquired consciously
but is imbibed through the process of habituation. Knowledge of the
latter kind is not so acquired. For we can learn about some things with-
out direct experience of them. Thus we can learn about music without
acquiring the knowledge of music that only musicians can have. And
so it is, Nisbet suggests, in the sphere of politics: "Any lively imagina-
tion can come up with asserted principles or laws of government, but
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only someone rich in knowledge of can provide the practical means of
leading or otherwise participating in some actual government."
Those who do not see that political activity must be rooted in an
appreciation of its practical character, and its dependence on practical
knowledge, are rationalists. And they are the ones responsible for his-
tory's many misguided attempts to reconstruct society according to
some grand, Utopian design, or to reform society according to its own
rationally discoverable first principles. The results of such attempts
have usually been brutal tyrannies; and the will to resist tyranny and
struggle for freedom, Nisbet suggests, comes not from "inner knowl-
edge of natural rights or from inner instincts to freedom" but from
prejudices: "prejudices slowly built up historically in people's minds:
prejudices about religion, property, national autonomy and long-
accustomed roles in the social order."
This attitude does, indeed, distinguish the conservative from the
liberal. And it is to be found not only in Nisbet's work, but also in the
writings of other modern conservatives such as Oakeshott and Roger
Scruton. But how defensible is this view? For the immediate problem
conservatives of the modern world must confront lies in the fact that,
after several decades of growth, the welfare state may have succeeded in
altering those prejudices which it is argued are necessary to resist tyr-
anny. In much of Britain and Western Europe religion has declined,
and throughout the West, even while attachment to property has not
been entirely eroded, the importance of private ownership is no longer
recognized. Moreover, it is difficult nowadays to think of political ac-
tivity as grounded in experience and knowledge drawn from shared
traditions of behavior. The spread of systems of mass communication
and the mobility of peoples everywhere has made many societies
highly pluralistic and characterized by competing, and indeed conflict-
ing, traditions. It is unclear how the conservative's political prescrip-
tions can be of help here. Indeed, it is unclear what they would be.
(Curiously, Nisbet also suggests that conservatives, like socialists
but unlike liberals, have political programs. "The socialists have, just as
do traditional conservatives, a complete and self-sufficient program
for all seasons, which is something liberals, who tend to live in hand-
and-mouth ideological circumstances, do not and never will have." Yet
surely it must be the dreaded rationalist who is thought by conser-
vatives to be "programmatic"?)
The problem conservatism faces is that, by placing so much em-
phasis on the importance of the practical knowledge embodied in tra-
ditions and social instititions, it can ofFer no account of how to deal
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with undesirable social institutions or with traditions which might
embody not knowledge but error. And clearly the modern world is
full of institutions, such as the growing public sector bureaucracies,
which many conservatives abhor. Indeed, conservatism can say little
about how we identify those traditions or practices, whether nascent
or well established, which promote great harms because they are
rooted in error.
Must Ideology Be Conserved?
These difficulties call our attention to the persistence of those unavoid-
able questions about the institutions appropriate for any society given
the facts of human ignorance, of the complexity of the genesis of
ideas, and of the prevalence of error.
The three books discussed here, despite their differences of focus,
share a common concern insofar as they suggest solutions to the prob-
lems of understanding and dealing with the world of ideas, beliefs and
practices. And they all see the importance for political theory of cer-
tain epistemological questions. So, at the risk of presenting a distorted
view of the primary concerns of these three stimulating and provoca-
tive works, it may be worth concluding with a comparative inquiry
into the value of their respective prescriptions.
What all three of these writers emphasize is the unsureness of our
understanding of human society. Despite the best attempts of modern
social theory to comprehend the workings of society, the fact is that its
mutability, its variety, indeed its sheer complexity, leave the fuller
understanding we seek difficult to attain. This problem is compounded
by the variety of explanations and interpretations of society which ap-
pear, not only in competing traditions of social inquiry but in different
moral and theological traditions as well.
The conservative response has essentially been to emphasize the
difficulty of finding any appropriate standpoint from which to exam-
ine, understand and criticize society and its traditions. And because it
sees great danger in attempts to do so, it prescribes an uncritical stance
toward social institutions and the traditions, ideas and beliefs which
sustain them. In this respect, we might say that the conservative atti-
tude toward the prevailing ideology is one which presumes that it is
difficult to comprehend and, to a large extent, must remain beyond
criticism. The problem with this attitude is that it leaves conservatism
unable to offer any guidance or advice to those who would evaluate
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and seek to change or reform modern social institutions. At best, con-
servative philosophy offers us a description of society—and no more.
(For conservatives such as Oakeshott, of course, this is all that political
philosophy can do.)
The theorists of ideology, on the other hand, argue that ideas are
part of a structure which reflects the dominance in society of particular
interests, and which controls or exercises power over the way in which
we think and choose. While liberation from such a situation may not
be completely attainable, any step taken in that direction must be on
the basis of an understanding of the nature of the ideology which gov-
erns us. Only when we see how our own perspective is distorted by
the social determination of our ideas can we criticize the prevailing
structure of thinking that dominates us. Thus Habermas, for example,
tries to elaborate a situation in which communication is not distorted
by social phenomena such as language. In contemporary society there
exist profound barriers to what he calls "discursive will-information,"
barriers to communication which make a fiction of the idea of ac-
countability and serve simply to sustain belief in the legitimacy of that
fiction. We can only criticize this if we can look at it from the perspec-
tive of members of a social system in which discourse does not suffer
from these problems.
The difficulty with this view, as we saw in our criticisms of McLel-
lan, is that it is hard to see how we might extricate ourselves from the
dominating influence of ideology. And if, like Habermas, we see ide-
ology buried in the very structure of language, it is hard to see how we
can use language to construct or articulate a linguistic perspective
which is not also cursed with the problems that beset every other arena
of discourse.
Recognizing the problems associated with these two views, I would
argue, points us in the direction of a more liberal attitude to the ques-
tion of ideology. For the liberal view concedes that we cannot over-
come the social determination of ideas, or control the power exerted
by ideas in social life, except insofar as we insist on making our institu-
tions open to criticism and change. Unlike conservatism, it sees many
dangers in the uncritical embracing of prevailing traditions of belief
or behavior, since they may embody not knowledge but destructive
falsehoods. The liberal attitude calls upon us to accept that nothing
may be deemed immune to question or criticism. And while Gray may
be right to say that conservatives have correctly pointed to the "vital
truth that the maintenance of moral and cultural traditions is a neces-
sary condition of lasting progress," this cannot mean that certain tradi-
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tions must be insulated against criticism. After all, it is important to
ask which traditions are of value; and our best hope for uncovering the
answer lies in leaving that question open to critical inquiry.
This liberal view is rooted in a conception of the nature of knowl-
edge which undercuts the conservative warning that such a rationalist
outlook can lead only to tyranny. While it is true that the revisionist
liberals have concluded that the "knowledge" uncovered by critical in-
quiry gives the state a warrant to act to reconstruct society for the
better, it can do this only by according to some agency the authority
to determine what must, for the construction of public policy, be
taken to be true. For the classical liberal this is impermissible, for the
generation of knowledge is made possible precisely because no agency
is given the authority to establish conclusions which may not be
challenged.
Against the theorists of ideology, on the other hand, the liberal ar-
gues that, while the prevailing ideas in society may well reflect the
existence of more persistent relations of power and domination, this in
no way suggests that there is not an important contrast between sci-
ence and ideology. Moreover, if these relations of power are to be chal-
lenged, it is particularly important to recognize the liberal conception
of science as growing only in a free society: in a society in which no
one's conclusions are authoritative, and no construction is immune to
criticism. It is only in such a society that the dominant powers may be
challenged and overturned. Yet even here, it must be conceded, there is
every likelihood that new forms of power and domination will emerge.
In this respect, there can never be an end to ideology—not even in
principle, as McLellan suggests. The best hope is for a society open to
criticism and change so that no ideology may become so entrenched
that it assumes the voice of authority.
NOTES
1. See Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, vol. 2 (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul 1977), 222, where he notes: "The sociology of knowledge
hopes to reform the social sciences by making the social scientists aware
of the social forces and ideologies which unconsciously beset them. But
the main trouble about prejudices is that there is no such direct way of
getting rid of them. For how shall we ever know that we have made any
progress in our attempt to rid ourselves from prejudice?"
2. Ibid., 217.
